欢迎光临999策略白菜手机论坛!
English Version设为首页加入收藏联系方式
学术视点 首页 - 学术视点 - 正文
Jingsheng Yu(余景升)*,Jun Zhang:Cores and mechanisms in restricted housing markets
时间:2023-02-13    点击数:

Abstract: We consider two variants of Shapley and Scarf’s (1974) housing market model in which agents’ rights to consume own endowments are restricted but their rights to exchange endowments are unrestricted. In each of the two models, we propose a core notion to characterize allocations that are immune to coalition blocking under such restricted rights. In each model we prove that the corresponding core can be found by a strategy-proof variant of the Top Trading Cycle mechanism. Our results generalize the classical result in the housing market model that the core can be found by the strategy-proof Top Trading Cycle mechanism.

该文在线发表于经济学综合性期刊Journal of Mathematical Economics。该期刊为999策略白菜手机论坛B+类期刊。

论文链接:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102625


Baidu
sogou